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Minority Representation,Empowerment,
and Participation

Susan A. Banducci
Texas Tech University
Universityof Twente, The Netherlands

ToddDonovan
Western WashingtonUniversity

JeffreyA. Karp
Texas Tech University
Universityof Twente,The Netherlands
According to the minorityempowermentthesis, minorityrepresentationstrengthensrepresentational
links, fosters more positive attitudestowardgovernment,and encouragespolitical participation.We
examine this theory from a cross-nationalperspective, making use of surveys that sampled minorities in the United States and New Zealand. Both countries incorporatestructuresinto their electoral
systems thatmake it possible for minoritygroups to elect representativesof their choice. We find that
in both countries descriptiverepresentationmatters:it increases knowledge about and contact with
representativesin the U.S. and leads to more positive evaluationsof governmentalresponsivenessand
increasedelectoralparticipationin New Zealand.These findingshave broadimplicationsfor debates
about minorityrepresentation.

Both New Zealandand the United States incorporatestructuresinto their electoral systems that make it possible for minoritygroups to elect representativesof
their choice in single-memberdistricts.' In the United States, this is achieved by
drawing special majority-minoritydistrictsthat maximize the numberof blacks
in a congressional district. In New Zealand, seats are set aside exclusively for
voters of Maori descent. In both countries, there were dramatic increases in
minorityrepresentationin nationallegislaturesin the 1990s (on the U.S. case see
Endersby and Menifeld 2000, and on the New Zealand case see Karp 2002).
However, such provisions have not been without controversy.Although the
experiences of minorities in these countries differ, descriptiverepresentationis
assumed to be an importantaspect of representationin either context.
1 Othercountriessuch as Belgium, Lebanon,Slovenia, and Zimbabwealso make special provisions
for ethnic minorityrepresentation(see Lijphart1986).

THEJOURNALOF POLITICS,
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Little, however,is known about what effect representationby a minority legislatorhas on the attitudesandbehaviorof minorityvoters.We examinethis question from a cross-nationalperspective,making use of survey data from the 1996
National Black Election Study(NBES) and the 1999 New ZealandElection Study
(NZES). Examiningthis question cross-nationallyallows us to make generalizations on the basis of more observationsthan would otherwise be the case if the
analysis were restrictedto one country.It also allows us to see if the effect of
minority empowermentvaries by context.

ElectoralStructuresand Minority
Representation
The question of how minority representationmight affect minority political
behavior is of particularimportancegiven the controversyover the creation and
maintenance of districts designed to enhance the descriptive representationof
underrepresentedgroups. Because the New Zealand case may be unfamiliarto
readers, our discussion describes in greaterdetails aspects of Maori representation in New Zealand.
In the United States, the 1982 amendmentsto the Voting Rights Act of 1965
and the Supreme Court's Thornburgv. Gingles decision of 1986 facilitated the
creation of U.S. House districts in which a minority population constitutes a
majority of the voting-age population (majority-minoritydistricts) so that black
and Latino candidates could potentially win elected office. After 1986, U.S.
Justice Departmentpolicy encouragedimplementationof this logic whereveran
area containeda large, cohesive minoritygroup (Butlerand Cain 1992, 36; Swain
1993, 197). For the 1990 redistricting,this resultedin practicesthat substantially
increased the numberof districts where blacks and Latinos comprised a supermajorityof districtvoters.The U.S. SupremeCourtaddedcomplexity to the issue
in 1993 by statinga lack of tolerancefor "bizarre"-shaped
districts(Shawv. Reno)
that might result from race-baseddistrictingand struck down plans where "race
was the predominantfactor motivating the drawing of district lines" (Miller v.
Johnson; Bush v. Vera;Shaw v. Hunt).2 Despite the continued controversyover
these districts, they have furtheredthe representationof blacks (and Latinos) in
the U.S. Congress. The largest gains in minority representationin the U.S. Congress occurred in the 1990s after state legislatures drew significant numbers of
majority-minoritydistrictfor the 1992 redistricting.
New Zealand,in contrast,has a much longer traditionof using districtingto
secure minority representation.Since 1867, the country has had a dual constituency system where representativesto the parliamentare elected from two
sets of single memberelectoratesone for persons of Maori descent and the other
for those of Europeandescent.3The contemporarynames for these ethnicallysep2 It is importantto stress that Shaw and associated cases do not overturnthe
Thornburgv. Gingles
criteriathat are used to establish majority-minoritydistricts.
3In New Zealand,legislative districts are referredto as electorates. Electoratesfor those of European descent were referredto as Europeanelectorates and districts for those of Maori descent are
referredto as Maori electorates.
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arateelectoratesare Maori and general electorates.The boundariesof these dual
electoratesare superimposedon the same geographicalspace. Thereare far fewer
Maori electoratesso the area of these electorates is much largerthan that of the
general electorates.
Creationof the Maori seats was a result of the Europeans'desire to pacify and
assimilate Maori (Sorrenson 1986) and to acceleratethe Europeanizationof the
Maori through their involvement in political affairs and Europeanlaw (Fleras
1985). Prior to the passage of the Maori RepresentationAct in 1867, property
requirementsdisqualifiedmost Maori from voting since Maori land was owned
communally.Foreshadowingconcerns about "packing"in the United States, an
additionalmotive for establishingseparateMaori seats was to ensurea European
majorityin every other seat and limit Maorirepresentation(see Weiner1998). At
the time the seats were created,the Maori populationwas around50,000, comparedto a Europeanpopulationof 250,000 (Sorrenson 1986, B-2 1). The creation
of four separateseats reserved for Maori in 1867, instead of the nearly 20 they
deserved,preemptedthe formationof a hostile Maoripowerbloc but also helped
to maintain their underrepresentation.4
This underrepresentationbecame even
more pronouncedas the number of Europeanelectorates continued to increase
with population(from 72 in 1867 to 95 in 1993), while the numberof Maorielectorates remainedfixed for 129 years. Thus, while giving the illusion of democraticpower sharing,Maoriwere gerrymanderedto the point where they became
a permanentlyoutvoted minority in a political system designed to suit majority
interests(Fleras 1985).
Electoralreform in the 1990s succeeded in furtheringMaori representationin
two importantways. The ElectoralAct of 1993 allowedthe numberof Maorielectorates,which had remainedfixed at four,to vary on the basis of enrollment.The
act providesfor the numberof Maoriseats to rise or fall dependingon the number
of Maori who choose to register on the Maori roll. After each five-year census,
the drawingof the new electoralboundariesbegins with a four-monthMaoriElectoral Optionduringwhich time those who indicateon theirenrollmentforms that
they are of Maori descent are sent letters asking them to choose between registering on the Maori or the general electoral roll. Thus, one major difference
between the Maori electorates and the majority-minoritydistricts in the United
States is that Maori can choose whetherthey want separaterepresentation.It is
estimatedthat if all Maori were enrolled on the Maoriroll, there would be about
13 Maori electorates(ElectoralCommission 2000).5 Since 1993, the percentage
of Maori choosing to take the Maori roll option has increasedsteadily,resulting
4The system of separateelectoratesalso createddouble standards.For example, the general electorate received the right to a secret ballot in 1870 but it was not extended to Maori until 1937; registrationwas made compulsory in 1929 for the general electorate but it did not apply to the Maori
electoratesuntil 1956 (Fleras 1985).
5Registrationin New Zealand is compulsory.While it is difficult to obtain precise figures on the
proportionof the electorate that is registered,due to the fact that census data are not broken down
by voting age population,it is estimatedthat over 90% of Maori are registeredon either roll.

This content downloaded from 140.160.178.72 on Thu, 23 Oct 2014 17:15:27 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Minority Representation,Empowerment,and Participation

537

in the creationof an additionalMaori seat in each of the three subsequentelections.6As of 2002, almost 170,000 Maori are representedin the seven electorates
(about 25,000 Maori per electorate).A U.S. Representative,in comparison,represents about 25 times more constituents.
Another significant contributionto the representationof Maori in the 1990s
was the introduction of proportional representation.In 1996, New Zealand
held its first election under a new German-styleelectoral system, referredto as
miked-member proportional (MMP), that maintains constituency representation while ensuringproportionaloutcomes. About half of the seats in parliament
are filled by constituency MPs while the other half are filled by MPs who are
on the party list.7 The commission that recommended the adoption of MMP
also recommendedabolishing the Maori electorates,as proportionalrepresentation for minority groups was assured via MMP (Royal Commission 1986).
However, the suggestion met with Maori resistance. Subsequently,Parliament
disregarded this recommendation and concluded that Maori should decide
when to abolish the Maori seats (see Weiner 1998). Since the party list determines the overall allocation of seats in parliament,parties have an incentive
to appeal to Maori voters despite the segregation of their constituency votes.
Such a system enables the minority to have a guaranteedlevel of descriptive
representationwithout risking loss of substantiveinfluence (Nagel 1995). The
adoptionof a proportionalpartylist electoral system togetherwith the dual electorateshas succeeded in increasingMaorirepresentationdramatically.Following
the first MMP election in 1996 the proportionof Maori in Parliamentdoubled
from 6 to 12%(Banducciand Karp 1998).8In the 1999 election, Maoriwere able
to maintainbut not improveon their representation,electing a total of 14 Maori
MPs, with equal numbers elected from the party list and electorate seats (see
Karp 2002).

6

In the second MaoriElectoralOptionroundheld in 1994, enrollmentincreasedfrom41% to 52%,
resulting in a fifth Maori seat. In comparison,in the previous Maori option held in 1991, there was
less than a 1%increase among those choosing to registeron the Maoriroll (personalcorrespondence
with Murray Wicks, Electoral Commission Officer, July 3, 2002). In 1997, Maori enrollment
increasedto 54% resultingin a sixth seat, effective in the 1999 election (ElectoralCommission 1997,
128). In 2001, a seventh seat was created following an increase of 4%.
7 The new MMP system in New Zealand is similar to Germany'selectoral system. Voterscast one
vote for their local MP and anotherfor a party.Partiesreceiving more than 5% of the vote are represented in parliamentin proportionto their vote. MMP increasedthe size of parliamentincreased
from 99 to 120. Of the 120 MPs who were elected in the first MMP election in 1996, 65 seats were
held by MPs elected in single-memberconstituenciesby first-past-the-post(plurality).Five of these
seats were reserved for Maori. The remaining55 seats were held by MPs on party lists.
8 In 1996, about40% of Maorienteringparliamentcame throughthe electoratesthough all of these
(with the exception of Winston Peters) were elected from the Maori roll. As for the party list, the
overall number of Maori was evenly distributedacross the five major parties, though some parties
placed Maori more prominentlythan others, with Labourhaving the highest proportionof Maori
elected from their list (Banducci and Karp 1998, 141).
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and
Theoriesof DescriptiveRepresentation
Empowerment
Minority
A numberof normativetheoristshave been skeptical of the merits of descriptive representationrelative to other models of representation(e.g., Birch 1971;
Pitkin 1972; see also Grofman 1982, 97-99). One concern is that there is a
trade-off between descriptiverepresentation(in the form of a larger numberof
minority membersin legislatures)and substantiverepresentation(in the form of
roll-call votes that advance minority interests). For example, higher concentrations of blacks in majority-minoritydistricts could strengthen Republican
prospectsin neighboringdistrictsand thus producea Congresswith more minorities but fewer total membersthat supportpolicies that many minority representatives promote. There are many studies that demonstratesome elements of a
tradeoffbetween substantiverepresentationof minorityinterestsand descriptive
representation(Cameron,Epstein, and O'Halloran 1996; Lublin 1997; Overby
and Cosgrove 1996; Swain 1993; Thernstrom 1987; Whitby 1997, 132-33),
although there may be some reasons to think that the immediate effects of any
tradeoffmightbe limitedor overstated(Bullock 1995, 155; Grofmanand Handley
1998, 61-62; and Whitby 1997, 132).
However, where controversyand empirical work have emanated from questions about what descriptiverepresentationmight deliver in terms of substantive
policies for minorities,uncertaintysurroundsquestions abouthow an increasein
representationmight affect other aspects of the political system, namely trust,
efficacy, and participation.While past research suggests that descriptiverepresentationmight not maximize the substantiveinterestsof minoritygroups at the
level of roll-call votes, increased minority representationmight produce other
effects that should be considered in any assessment of the potential tradeoffs
between substantiveand descriptiverepresentation.Among these effects are what
Mansbridge(1999, 642) identifiesas the "communicativeadvantages"of descriptive representation.Withouta descriptiverepresentative,some constituentsmay
face barrierscommunicatingand identifying with their representative.In contrast, the presence of a representativeof the same race, ethnicity or gender can
break down such barriers.Mansbridge(1999) cites as an example Fenno'sportraitof a black member'sinteractionswith his constituents:"everyexpressionhe
gives or gives off conveys the idea 'I am one of you' " (1978, 115; see also Swain
1993, 219). Cain notes that the effects of majority-minoritydistricting"mustbe
weighted against the losses in system legitimacy and stability when minority
voices are not well represented"(1992, 273).
Along these lines, empowermenttheory also suggests that descriptiverepresentationhas positive effects on minoritycitizens. Visible political leadershipby
membersof a minoritygroup should enhancetrustin government,efficacy,group
pride, andparticipation(see Gurin,Hatchett,and Jackson 1989;Tate 1991). Bobo
and Gilliam (1990) suggest thatminoritycitizens can become "empowered"after
they have achieved significantdescriptiverepresentationand influence in politi-
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cal decision making. Bobo and Gilliam reasonedthat empowermentvia descriptive representationshould influenceparticipationbecause the presence of minority representativescreates macro-level cues that affect how people perceive the
costs andbenefitsof voting (1990, 379). These contextualcues signal likelypolicy
responsiveness"thatencouragesminoritiesto feel that participationhas intrinsic
value" (1990, 387). In other words, the presence of minority elected officials
sends a contextual cue to minority citizens that the benefits of voting outweigh
the costs of not voting.
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) offer empiricalevidence supportingtheir theory that
minorityempowermentis associatedwith greaterparticipation.Conceptuallyand
empirically they focused on the effects of blacks holding the mayor's office of
large U.S. cities. Using a rare survey that oversampledblacks, they found that
black citizens in cities having black local-elected officials were more likely to
participate.Similar results have also been found by others. Howell and Fagan
(1988) show that black citizens in New Orleans are much more trusting than
AfricanAmericans in a national sample, and they attributethis differenceto the
presence of a black mayor.These attitudinaldifferences also extend to approval
of minorityrepresentatives.Howell concludes that"blackvoters, because of their
racial identification,are more likely to approveof the mayor regardlessof their
evaluationsof general and specific city conditions"(2000, 69). Using aggregate
data at the municipallevel, black candidatesappearto generategreaterlevels of
political interest(Vanderleeuwand Utter 1993) and consequentlyhigher turnout
(Gilliam and Kaufman 1998) among African-Americans.However,the presence
of black incumbents, as opposed to black candidates, is associated with lower
turnout(Lublin and Tate 1995, 253).
Very few studies have extended Bobo and Gilliam'sthesis and findings to the
national context. Brace et al. (1995) tested the empowermentthesis by examining if minority-dominatedcongressionaldistrictswere associated with increased
turnout.Their study was limited to two time periods (1988 and 1992) and utilized aggregate-level(precinct)data from Florida.Results were mixed, with evidence that turnoutincreasedmore over time in 46 predominantlyblack precincts
that had moved from majority-whiteto majority-blackcongressional districts
than it increased in 13 predominantlywhite precincts. However, they largely
dismiss this effect, noting that it disappearedwhen controls for the presence of
black candidateswere introduced.The researchersdid establish that a majority
Hispaniccongressionaldistrictwas associatedwith a 10-12% increasein turnout,
other things being equal (Brace et al. 1995, 199). These aggregateresults, while
suggestive, tell us little about how we might generalize beyond Florida,9nor do
they establish which citizens might be affected by the presence of a majority'Florida is a difficult case from which to generalize, as it has some of the least competitive
legislative districts in the world. In the 1992 general election, two newly created majority-minority
(Hispanic)seats were uncontested.By the 1998 generalelection, 18 of 23 congressionaldistrictswere
uncontested.
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minoritydistrict.In a more recent study,Gay (2001) uses an ecological inference
model to estimate black and white turnoutrates for congressional districts with
and without black representatives.She finds little evidence to suggest that the
election of African Americans to Congress increases turnout among black
citizens.
In general, the shortage of research on the consequences of minority representationis unsettling since there is a rival hypothesis to the minority empowerment thesis that suggests that methods to enhance minority representation
through districting might actually depress turnout. For example in the United
States, some observers suggest that because "safe" majority-minoritydistricts
would ensure minority representation,they might be associated with depressed
turnoutin the long run (Amy 1993; Guinier 1994). Fromthis perspective,descriptive representationvia majority-minoritydistrictscould thus lead to a downward
spiral of minority engagementand participation.

Minority
Experiencein New Zealandand the UnitedStates
Although the focus of this paper is on electoral institutionsthat enhance the
representationof previously underrepresentedgroups, the experiences of the
under representedgroups we study vary in importantways. Each group, Maori
and African-Americans,is considered a "protectedclass"; however, Maori, as
tangatawhenua [originalpeople of the land], are the victims of settler colonization while black Americanswere broughtto the United States as slaves and then
suffered from segregation.Additionally,while black Americans suffered the ill
effects of segregation,Europeansettlers thoughtthat, throughintermarriageand
culturalassimilation,Maori would become fully integratedwith the settler population. Maorilay claim to entitlementsestablishedunderthe Treatyof Waitangi,
the documentestablishingBritishsovereigntyoverNew Zealandsigned in 1840.10
Maori also have their own language that is recognized as one of the two official
languages of New Zealand.While some Maori may not consider themselves as
an ethnic minority,their subordinationby colonial powers, subsequent special
status, and proportionwithin the populationhas led to the institutionalizationof
the cultural differences and hence recognition as an ethnic minority (Linnekin
and Poyer 1990, 12).
Maori and blackAmericansdo sharea common experienceas a disadvantaged
group in society where the dominantculturalgroup is of West Europeandescent.
Social and economic disparitiesbetween Maori and New ZealandEuropeansare
comparableto those between black and white Americans. In terms of demographics and socioeconomic status, the position of Maori in New Zealand is
loIn signing the Treatyof Waitangiin 1840, Maori exchanged their governancerights (according
to the BritishCrownthey exchangedtheir sovereignty)for the guaranteesof the treaty(Orange 1987).
The Treatyeffectively establishedNew Zealand as a British colony. The treaty is regardedby Maori
as an affirmationof rights and a "sacredpact" with the ancestors of New Zealand.
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remarkablysimilarto thatof AfricanAmericansin the United States.Maoricomprise 14.5% of the populationcomparedto 12.6%African American (Statistics
New Zealand 1996; United States Bureau of the Census 1996). Like African
Americans,Maori have lower income and educationlevels; have higher rates of
unemployment,teenage pregnancy,and single-parentfamilies; and are incarcerated at a rate that is disproportionateto their size of the population(see Sullivan
1997, 364). In short, Maori are regardedas sufferingthe typical consequences of
social disruptiondue to colonialism (Ritchie 1990).
Maori also sharewith AfricanAmericanscontinuoussupportfor a partyto the
left of center.As with AfricanAmerican'ssupportfor the Democraticparty,Maori
supportfor the left-of-centerparty in New Zealandoriginatedduringthe depression of the 1930s. The LabourPartywas supportiveof welfare reformsthatequalized unemploymentbenefits between Maori and non-Maori and provided other
benefits such as disability and old-age pension that were pushed by the Ratana
movement, a religious and political movement that secured the Maori vote for
the Labourparty (see Sullivan and Vowles 1998). The alliance forged under the
Labourgovernmentof the 1930s endured,and all Maori seats were held by the
Labourpartybetween 1943 and 1993. Aftergrowing disillusionmentwith Labour
(Dalziel and Fox 1996), Maori turnedto the populist New Zealand First party,
headed by a Maori and former National party minister Winston Peters, in the
1993 election. However, after a number of scandals New Zealand First Maori
MPs lost the respect of Maorivoters, and Maorivoters returnedin large numbers
to the Labourparty in the 1999 election (see Sullivan and Margaritis2002).
While Bobo and Gilliam (1990) specificallytest minorityempowermentin the
case of black mayors in U.S. cities, there are reasons to expect that these arguments would apply in other cases where structuresare in place to encouragerepresentationamong previouslyunderrepresentedgroups (i.e., U.S. House districts
and Maori electorates).Despite differentexperiences,the political and social and
economic contexts of the indigenouspopulationin New Zealandlead us to expect
similar effects of descriptiverepresentationon underrepresentedgroups in New
Zealandand the United States.The historicalroots of injusticemay vary between
the two countries,but there are importantsimilaritiesbetween the two cases that
make them useful cases for comparison. Group consciousness, socioeconomic
inequalities and single party support since the depression are points of comparison between the two groups.

Expectationsaboutthe Effectsof Minority
Representation
Based on the minority empowermentthesis, we would expect that minorities
representedby minorities are more likely to feel trustful toward government,
experience higher level of efficaciousness and exhibit higher levels of participation thanminoritieswith nonminorityrepresentatives.In the United States,blacks
living in minority-majoritydistrictsthen should score higher on these indicators
than blacks outside these districts.If the empowermentthesis applies to the New
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Zealand case, improvementsin descriptiverepresentationvia the party list may
be associated with a strongerlevel of attachmentto the political system among
all Maori, regardless of whether they choose to register on the Maori roll.
However, if empowermentoperates primarilythrough constituency representation, then Maori choosing to be on the Maori roll should feel a greatersense of
efficacy, and, possibly, a greaterlikelihood of participationthan those Maori in
general electorates. Given that the Maori electorates overlap with the general
electorates,Maori who choose not to be on the Maori roll neverthelessreside in
an area representedby a Maori electorateMP. However,they may be less likely
to consider the Maori electorate MP as their own representative.In contrast,
Maori on the roll will have voted in the contest to choose their own representative, and, despite the advent of the party list vote in New Zealand, voters still
maintainclose ties to electorateMPs and the personalvote is important(Vowles
et al. 1998).
The rival hypothesis to minority empowermentis that descriptiverepresentation may lead to unintendedand negative consequences. By being concentrated
in districtsthat will automaticallyelect Maori representatives,Maorimight actually have less incentive to participatein electing their constituency representatives since Maori will be elected regardless of individual vote decisions. For
similarreasons, blacks may have less incentive to participatein minority-majority districts.However,while the likelihood of electing a minority representative
is increased,it is not guaranteedin these electorates as it is in the Maori electorates.Because the numberof Maori seats is predeterminedfar more by enrollment than election-day decisions, the incentives to vote might be further
dampened."
Additionally,the positive effects of empowermentmight be reducedgiven the
fact that Maori have long had guaranteedrepresentationthroughthe Maori electorates.There is anotherreason to expect that minority empowermentmight be
more evident in the U.S. case than in New Zealand. In New Zealand,minority
empowermentis achieved throughregisteringon the Maori roll. In some ways,
Maori not on this roll may be achieving the benefits of the Maori electorates,
(descriptive representation),without paying the costs (e.g., less competitive
districts).

Empowerment
TestingHypothesesaboutMinority
Bobo and Gilliam (1990) measure the effect of descriptiverepresentationon
a large set of factors that measurepolitical activity,attitudestowardgovernment
and elected officials, political knowledge, and engagement in politics. We use
similar indicatorsbut divide them into two categories:district-basedevaluations
and activity (such as knowledge and approvalof the representativeand contact"There may of course be other incentives to participate.Maori may be motivatedto get a member
of their own tribe or family or churchinto parliament.
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ing the representative)and system-basedevaluationsand activity (such as political efficacy and voting). In the first case, the object of the evaluationor activity
is the representative.The empowermentthesis posits that there will be a benefit
to the constituent from racial or ethnic identity with his or her representative.
Therefore,we expect thatevaluationsof the representativewill be positively influenced by this identity.We also expect that identity with the representativewill
positively influence system-basedactivity and evaluations.

Data and Methods
Tests of the effect of minority empowermenton attitudes and turnout and
models of minorityparticipationhave been constrainedby dataavailability.Standard random-samplesurveys such as the American National Election Study
(ANES) are not useful for examining the effects of variationin minoritylegislative representationbecause there are few minority respondents,and even fewer
who have minorityrepresentatives.We follow the approachof Bobo and Gilliam
(1990) and Tate (1991), who used rare surveys that either oversampledthe black
populationor were limited to blacks by relying on surveys that sampled blacks
in the United States and Maori in New Zealand.The 1996 National Black Election Study (NBES) is based on telephone interviews of 1,216 voting eligible
blacks completed before the 1996 Presidentialelection and 854 who were reinterviewed after the election.'2The survey was designed to explore the electoral
attitudesand behaviorof blacks and has an explicit congressionalfocus (see Tate
1996, 2001). Respondentswere matchedto theircongressionaldistrictsandasked
to evaluatetheir House representatives.A total of 252 House districtsare represented in the sample, including the districts of 34 of the 39 black members of
Congress. In all, 31% of the black respondentswere representedby these black
legislators.
In New Zealand,a Maori survey was designed in conjunctionwith the New
ZealandElection Study (NZES) to measure Maori political attitudesand behavior following the 1999 GeneralElection. Face-to-faceinterviewswere conducted
with 1000 persons of Maori descent in December 1999 and January2000 using
a national multistage stratified probability sample with clustering.13 Maori
respondentsof voting age were selected regardlessof enrollmentstatus;thus, we
can make comparisonsbetween Maori enrolled on either the Maori or general
rolls. The timing of both surveys takes full advantageof the increases in minor12

The response rate for the preelection wave was 65%.

13A.C. Neilson (NZ) Ltd conductedthe interviewson behalf of the NZES. Maorihouseholds were

sampled from units that contained at least 5% Maori and respondentschosen randomlywithin the
household.The sample is weightedby age and genderto reflect the Maoripopulation.Personalinterviews were chosen because of the high rate of residentialmobility among Maori, especially younger
Maori, plus factors such as lower access to telephones, a tendency to live in largerhouseholds than
the generalpopulation,and the culturallymore acceptablepracticeof kanohiki kanohi(face-to-face).
The response rate was 54%.
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ity representationthat occurred in both countries in the 1990s. Togetherthese
data sets provide a unique opportunityto examine the impact of descriptive
representation.Rarely do researchershave the opportunityto examine minority
attitudes using a large sample in one country; two large samples of minority
populationsprovidean uncommonopportunityto make comparisonsboth within
and across countries.
Our measuresof district-basedevaluationsand activity are ability to recall the
name of the representative,job approvalof the representative,and contactingthe
representative.Twootherindicatorsfromthe NBES ask respondentsto recall anything special that the representativehas done for the districtand whetherthe representativeis doing a good job keepingtouch. Governmentalresponsiveness,trust
in government, and interest served by government are used as indicators of
system-based evaluations.Reported vote is used to indicate political participation. There is great similarity across the two studies in terms of the questions.
Questions are detailed in Table 1 and full question wordingis given in an appendix availablefrom the authors.'4

BivariateResults
Table 1 is a firstlook at the potentialeffect of minorityempowerment(via representationin the national legislature) on these indicators.These bivariatedata
reveal similar levels of awarenessand contact with legislators among minorities
in both the United States and New Zealand despite considerabledifferences in
the numberof persons representedin each district. Between 20 and 30% know
the name of their representativeand between 15 and 20% report having some
contact with their representativeor MP. In the United States, blacks are more
likely to know the name of theirrepresentativewhen he or she is also black. Blacks
are also more likely to reporthaving contactwith a black representativethan with
a representativewho is not black.A similarrelationshipis evidentin New Zealand
but the differencesare only slight. Overall,about 15%reporthaving contactwith
theirMP at some time over the past 12 months.Althoughnot reportedin the table,
only a very small percentage of the Maori on the general roll (who are representedby a non-MaoriMP) reportedhavingcontactwith the MaorielectorateMP
from their area.This providessupportfor our expectationthat Maoriwho choose
not to take the Maori option are more likely to consider their general electorate
MP, and not the Maori electorateMP, as their representative.
Larger differences are evident in evaluations of representativesand MPs. In
the United States,65% of blacks approveof theirblackrepresentativeswhile only
44% approveof representativeswho are not black." Blacks are also more likely
14

See http://www.banducci.com/articles/jop2004/.
These are based on post election responses. In the preelectionwave, there is a largergap which
is due to a lower approvalof non minorityrepresentativesamong blacks (36%). In comparisonthose
representedby AfricanAmericanrepresentativeswerejust as likely to approveof their performance
in the preelectionwave.
5
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TABLE1

Effects of MinorityEmpowerment
United States
Nonminority
Minority
Representative Representative Difference
Correctlyrecall name of representative
Contactrepresentative
Recall anything special representativehas
done for district+
Representativejob (very good) keeping in
touch+
Approvalof representative'sperformance
People like me have no say (% in agreement)
You can trust governmentmost of the time
Governmentis run by big interests
Reportedvoting
N

n

Nonmino
Represen

9.7
8.3
16.2

22.3
13.6
32.0

12.6**
5.3**
15.8**

1199
1199
662

24.5
13.0
na

17.6

34.0

16.4**

663

na

44.0
44.1
29.4
66.5
73.6
776

65.1
39.2
28.2
70.4
79.3
440

21.1**
-4.9
-1.2
3.9

838
838
837
836
836
1216

31.4
63.0
34.4
64.6
70.9
461

5.7a

Source: National Black Election Study, 1996; New Zealand Maori Election Study, 1999.
Note: First two questions in the Black Election Study were administeredin the pre-election wave; all others were
sample size is due to attrition.
+Asked only of those who recognize representative'sname.
**p < .01; *p < .05.
ap = .06.
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to believe the representativeis in touch and more likely to believe the representativehas done somethingspecial for the districtwhen thatrepresentativeis black.
In New Zealand,Maori are more critical of their Maori MPs. Overall,just 22%
approvedof their Maori MPs while approvalfor non-MaoriMPs was 31%. The
low levels of approvalfor the Maori electorateMPs reflect in part their association with the New ZealandFirstparty,whose electoralsupportdroppedfrom 13%
in 1996 to less than 5% in 1999.16 The party,which positioned itself in 1996 as
a centrist party, held the balance of power after the 1996 election and subsequently enteredinto a coalition with National whose policies were not compatible with traditionalMaori issue positions (Sullivan 1997; Sullivan and Vowles
1998). Halfway throughthe parliamentaryterm, the coalition governmentcollapsed, and all of the Maori electorateMPs defected from their party to support
a National minority government.
While these results so far suggest that evaluationsof minorityrepresentatives
differacross countries,feelings of responsivenessand participationaremore consistent. In New Zealand,Maori appearto have greaterfeelings of powerlessness
than blacks. However,in both countries, slightly fewer believe they have no say
when they have a minorityrepresentative.On the measuresthat tap more diffuse
attitudestowardgovernment,we find strikingsimilaritiesacross countries.About
two-thirdsof blacks and Maori believe that their country is run by big interests
and just a third believe that governmentcan be trusted most of the time. There
are, however, few differences within countries indicatingthat descriptiverepresentation does not matterwith respect to these attitudes.These results are consistent with Bobo and Gilliam (1990, 383) who find that "local" empowerment
did not change trust in the federal governmentor improveblacks' views of the
motivationsof politicians in general. However,the results in Table 1 do suggest
that empowermentmobilizes voters. Although participationrates vary across
countries,both blacks and Maori appearto be more likely to vote when they are
representedby a minority.

The Effects of MinorityEmpowerment:MultivariateModels
In Tables 2 and 3 we model the effect of minority empowermenton recall,
contact,approval,efficacy,andvoting when controllingfor otherfactors.Keeping
in touch and doing something special have been droppedfrom the multivariate
analysis due to their absence from the New Zealanddata set. Because there were
no significantdifferencesin the bivariateanalysis, we do not include trust in governmentand governmentrun by big interests." In additionto the term reflecting
16Although New Zealand First failed to cross the 5% threshold it still managed to retain parliamentaryrepresentationbecause its leader,Winston Peters,managedto retainhis electorate seat by a
slim marginof 67 votes.
17 Because a significantrelationshipcould be suppressedby anotherfactor, we estimateda model
with trustand big interestsas dependentvariables.However,the multivariateanalysis did not produce
any significantdifferencesbetween those with and those without a minorityrepresentative.
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TABLE 2

UnitedStates
Impactof Empowerment:
Logit
Coefficients
Variables

Recall Name of
Representative

MinorityRepresentative
Education
Identify w/same party as Rep
Female
Age (in 10s)
Income
Economy
Attend religious service
Urbanresidence
South
Constant1
Constant2
Constant3
Constant4
Pseudo R2
N

1.03**
3.02**
.69**
-.67**
.19**
.65
1.20**
-.03
-.51"
-.53
-5.37**

.22
1208

(.23)
(.50)
(.20)
(.19)
(.06)
(.44)
(.38)
(.43)
(.24)
(.28)
(.54)

Contact
Representative
.49*
1.93**
.38
-.17
.17*
1.79**
.53
.57
-.39
-.44
-5.50**

(.25)
(.54)
(.22)
(.21)
(.07)
(.49)
(.42)
(.48)
(.26)
(.31)
(.60)

.12
1208

**p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailedtest).
Standarderrorsare in parentheses.
Source: Black Election Study, 1996.
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Approve of
Representative's
Performance
.62**
.41
.86**
-.29*
.11*
.44
-.18
1.00**
-.15
-.08
-.65
.02
1.60**
2.46**
.12
832

P

(.16)
(.37)
(.14)
(.14)
(.04)
(.31)
(.26)
(.30)
(.16)
(.17)
(.35)
(.35)
(.35)
(.35)

83

TABLE3

Impactof Empowerment:New Zealand
Recall Name of
Representative

Logit Coefficients
Variables
MinorityRepresentative
Education
Identify w/same party as Rep
Female
Age (in 10s)
Income
Economy
Attend religious service
Tribalresidence
Constant 1
Constant2
Constant3
Constant4
Pseudo R2
N

.17
2.05**
.10
-.22
.37**
2.03**
-.29
-.22
.70**
-4.47**

(.17)
(.44)
(.21)
(.16)
(.06)
(.39)
(.42)
(.18)
(.17)
(.49)

Contact
Representative
.24
2.75**
-.08
.17
.21**
.66
-.25
-.11
.48*
-4.76

.09

.18
966

(.20)
(.53)
(.27)
(.19)
(.07)
(.46)
(.50)
(.21)
(.20)
(.57)

966

**p < .01; *p < .05 (two-tailedtest).
Standarderrorsare in parentheses.
Source: New ZealandMaori Election Study, 1999.
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Approve of
Representative's
Performance
-.56**
.30
-.17
-.14
.01
-.45
.43
-.39*
.12
-2.78**
-1.69**
.95*
2.81**
.04
904

(.14)
(.36)
(.17)
(.13)
(.05)
(.34)
(.35)
(.15)
(.14)
(.40)
(.39)
(.39)
(.41)

P

1

-

1

2
2
5
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the race or ethnicity of the representative(minorityrep), anothermeasureof representationis includedthatcontrolsfor whethera citizen is representedby a party
with which they identify (Identify w/party of rep.). We assume that individuals
who are representedby someone of the same partywill have more positive views
about politics and governmentalresponsiveness.Ourmodels also control for the
effects of factors expected to influence attitudes about government, including
level of education, gender, age, income, evaluationsof the economy, and place
of residence. These are labeled, respectively,Education, Female, Age, Income,
Economy, and Urban residence or Tribalresidence (full coding is availablefrom
the authors). We have also included an indicator of religiosity in the model
(Attend religious service).'5 Churchattendancehas been found to be an important mobilizing factor for black Americans(Alex-Assensoh andAssensoh 2001).
We might also expect that church attendanceamong Maori acts as a source of
psychologicaland social attachmentto the communityandfosters greaterturnout.
We also include a dummyvariablefor Southerners(in the U.S. model). To ease
the interpretationof the coefficients and assess their relative impact, all independent variables have been rescaled from 0 to 1. All dependentvariables are
constructed such that higher values indicate more positive evaluations or attitudes. Since the dependentvariablesare eitherdichotomousor orderedresponses
to survey questions, models are estimatedwith logit.

Results
Table 2 reportsthe results for the United States. The effect of minorityrepresentative is more prominentfor the district-basedevaluationsand activity than
for the system-basedevaluationsand activity.The effects of minority empowerment are significantand in the expected directionon recall, contact,and approval.
Even when controlling for party identification,blacks are more likely to recall
the name of their representative,more likely to contact the representative,and
approveof his or her performance.As the probabilitiesdisplayedin Table4 show,
the likelihood of recalling the name of a minority representativeis more than
twice as high (.21) as recalling the name of a representativewho is not black
(.09). While the likelihood of contacting a representativewho is black remains
relatively low, it is nonetheless slightly higher than for a representativewho is
not black. Moreover,blacks are far more likely to approveof their representative
when he or she is also black (.61) thanwhen he or she is not (.46). However,with
regardto efficacy and political participation,minorityrepresentationappearsto
have no significantimpact.
When comparing the effect of minority representationto same party representation, we see that policy congruence matters in name recall and approval
18InNew Zealand, 71% reportednot attendingChurchat all comparedto just 5% in the United
States. Therefore,in New Zealand whether or not a respondentreportedattending Churchis used
while the frequencyof attendanceis taken into account in the United States.
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TABLE4

EstimatedProbabilities
United States

New Zealand

Minority
Nonminority
Nonminority
Minority
Representative Representative Representative Representative
Correctlyrecall name
of representative
Contact representative
Approvalof representative's
performance
People like me have no say
(likelihood of disagreement)
Reportedvoting

.09

.21

.21

.24

.08
.46

.12
.61

.12
.31

.14
.21

.55

.55

.06

.08

.76

.76

.73

.81

Note: Estimatesare derivedfromTables2 and 3 holding all othervariablesconstantat theirmeans.

of the representative.However,unlike minority representation,identifying with
the same party as the representativedid not influence contactwith the representative. Also, the size of the coefficient for Identify w/party of rep indicates that
it has less of an impact on recall and contact than minority rep. As for approval,
both measureshave a similar influence. Religious attendance,on the other hand,
influences approvaland responsiveness, but does not have much influence on
voting.19

The resultsfor New Zealandarepresentedin Table3. Unlike the United States,
the effect of minorityrepresentationis more prominenton the system-basedevaluations and activity than district-basedevaluations.The ethnicity of the MP does
not appearto matterfor recall or contactbut it does have an influenceon responsiveness. Maoriwho choose to be representedby Maori electorateMPs are more
likely to believe that they have a say than those representedby electorate MPs
who are not Maori. Although the likelihood of feeling efficacious is small for
Maori regardlessof enrollmentstatus (see Table4), the likelihood of having the
lowest level of efficacy is higher for Maori on the generalroll (.45) than those on
the Maori roll (.38).20 This suggests that the Maori electoratessucceed in fostering a greatersense of efficacy among those Maori who choose to take advantage
of the Maori option. Maori, however,are more critical of their Maori MPs than
those on the general roll. Nevertheless, minority empowermentappearsto lead
19While these results are inconsistentwith Alex-Assensoh and Assensoh (2001), they are consistent with Calhoun-Brown(1996) who uses the NBES and finds that churchattendancedoes not make
a difference for black political participation,though membershipin a political churchdoes.
20 Because the variablehas five categories, the probabilityof falling into any one category differs.
The largest differences occur across the categories of agreement, ratherthan disagreement,which
probablyreflects the way in which the question was asked.
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to greaterparticipation.Those on the Maori roll have a probabilityof voting of
.81 as comparedto .73 for those who are on the general roll.
In neitherthe United States or the New Zealandcase is economic performance
a significant predictor of representativeapprovalthough more positive assessments enhances the degree to which both blacks and Maori believe they have a
say in what governmentdoes. While educationhas the largest impact on voting
in both countries,with nearlyidenticaleffects, the impactof ethnicity on turnout
is greaterin New Zealandthan the effect of race in the United States. Unlike the
United States, partisaneffects are not significantin any of the models indicating
thatthose who identifiedwith the same partyas theirrepresentativewere no more
or less affected than those identifying with other parties regardlessof minority
representation.This suggests that the partisanshipof the representativeor MP is
more likely to make a difference for minority citizens in the United States than
in New Zealand.21
While not a factor in the United States, self-selection may explain some of the
differencesobserved in New Zealand.Personschoosing to registeron the Maori
roll may be motivatedby several factors that distinguishthem from their counterpartson the general roll. One incentive for choosing to remain on the Maori
roll is to furtherthe representationof Maori since the numberof Maori seats are
determinedby enrollment.Maori activists who opt for the Maori roll to further
their representationmay be highly educatedand engaged in the political process.
Others,however,may choose the Maori option if they are disenchantedor alienated from the political system. For them, the Maori option may serve as a means
of registeringprotest.An analysis of the data suggests that none of these factors
influences the decision to take the Maori option. Those opting to registeron the
Maori roll did not significantly differ on any sociodemographiccharacteristics
with one exception. Those with lower incomes were more likely to be on the
Maori roll. Greaterpolitical interestis also evident among Maoriwho are on the
Maori roll.22To determinewhetherthis influencedthe results in Table3, we estimated anothermodel controlling for political interest.While the coefficient for
minority rep was slightly reduced,the results remained statistically significant.
Overall these findings point to the conclusion that the results observed in Table
2 are not likely to be the result of self-selection.

Conclusions
Many of these results are consistentwith expectationsderivedfromthe minority empowermentthesis. In the United States,the race of the representativeinflu21 AfricanAmericans appearto have much
strongerlevels of partisanshipthan Maori; specifically
almost half (47.5%) of AfricanAmericansstronglyidentify with a partyas comparedto just 22% for
Maori. The lower levels of partisanshipamong Maori almost certainly reflect disillusionmentwith
the Labourparty in the 1980s and early 1990s and New ZealandFirst in the late 1990s.
22 While this may be due to self-selection, we cannotrule out the possibility thatbeing on the Maori
roll enhancespolitical interest,which would still be consistent with the minorityempowermentthesis.
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ences recall, contact, and approval.In New Zealand,Maori who are represented
by Maori electorate MPs are more likely to believe they have a say in government but are also more critical of their MPs. In New Zealand, Maori are also
more likely to vote when their representativeis also of Maori descent. While
descriptiverepresentationmattersin differentways, the evidence fromboth countries leads one to conclude that the effects of descriptiverepresentationare generally positive.
These resultscomplicatea discussion of the potentialtradeoffbetweendescriptive and substantiverepresentation.They illustratethat enhanceddescriptiverepresentationof minorities might produce normativegains that are removed from
issues of whether such practices as minority-majoritydistricts accomplish or
harmthe substantiverepresentationof minorities.Our findingsillustratesome of
the legitimacygains associatedwith minorityvoices being representedin the U.S.
Congress and the N.Z. House of Representatives.If we desire electoralpractices
that strengthenrepresentationallinks and encourage participation,then the use
of special districtsthat enhance descriptiverepresentationappearto yield some
modest but valuable returns. We suspect that many electoral practices could
produce similar effects if they empowerminoritiesby enhancingtheir prospects
for representation(e.g., PR, cumulativevoting, limited voting, etc.). But we must
also consider that the natureof single-memberdistricts might enhance the link
between representativeand constituent (see Farrell 2001) and that minority
empowermentis more likely to be achieved under electoral systems that maximize this link.
The relationship between minority representationand voter turnout further
complicates the issue of a tradeoff.We have shown that minority representation
increases the likelihood that minority citizens will vote in those places where
minoritieshold office (see the bivariateresults in the United States and the multivariateresults in New Zealand).However,it is difficult to conjectureabout the
aggregateeffect thatminorityempowermenthas on turnout.23Forexample, in the
United States, aggregate turnoutin districts with black representationmight be
lower because of a reducedlikelihood that whites will vote (see Gay 2001). This
negative effect suggests that, althoughminoritypopulationsmay be more likely
to vote, there is no guaranteethat overallturnoutwill increasewhen districtsare
drawnto facilitate the election of minority representatives.It is possible in the
United States, however, that turnout effects could operate on elections for
governor,senator,and president.A numberof statewide contests in states with
majority-minorityblack districtswere decided by marginsof less than 1%in the
1990s.24 Small changes in turnoutgeneratedfrom within one or two minorityEstablishingsuch aggregate-leveleffects are beyond the scope of this paper.
24Examplesinclude the 1996 LA senate race, won by 5,788 votes; the 1994 AL and SC and 1999
MS governorraces, and the 1996 GA senate race. In the 1990s, four Democraticsenatorsfrom states
with majority-minoritydistricts were elected with margins of less than 3% (LandrieuLA, Cleland
GA, Hollings SC, and Feinstein CA).
23
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representeddistrictscould swing extremelyclose statewideraces towardDemocratic candidates, and thus possibly enhance the substantiverepresentationof
black interests. In New Zealand's mixed system, increases in turnout that are
linked to minority representativesin the single-memberdistrict may also spill
over to the partyvote. Because we cannotbe certainof the impact that increased
minority turnout has on the policy positions of elected representatives,it is
unclearwhetherthe net effect of any differences in turnoutrates inside majorityminorityHouse districtsor Maori electorates leads necessarily to changes in the
substantiverepresentationof minorities.
It is importantto note that we cannot establish how sustained these effects
on efficacy, trust, and turnoutmay be. In both cases, we have relied on data that
is a snapshot of one election that for idiosyncratic reasons may explain some
of the differences. As Tate (1991) suggest, once minority representationis
achieved interest and, thus, turnoutdecline. At the same time, it is also reasonable to expect that minority citizens affected by descriptiverepresentationmay
become socialized into the habit of voting more frequently,particularlyif their
attitudesaboutgovernmentalresponsivenessbecome more positive. In the United
States, the more recent majority-minoritydistricts may have worked to spark
interestin the election and turnout.Increasesin Maori representationthroughan
increase in the numberof Maori seats and throughPR may have enhanced the
awareness of descriptive representation.Yet as our results show, the effects of
increasedrepresentationwere more likely to be felt by those representedby Maori
electorate MPs. What remains unclear is whether or not the difference we see
will persist.Long-termpanel studies of minoritiesarerequiredto investigatesuch
questions.
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